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The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form 
this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether 
the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not 
enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition, 
see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat 
answer to these questions to be formulated. 
Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing 
global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and 
the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some 
of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian com-
pany is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. 
The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself 
and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 
2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of 
this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business 
activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, 
are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s 
finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. 
Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, 
and what consequences this will have for the European Union. 
The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and natu-
re of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation 
on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European 
Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include 
proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.
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• Gazprom is the world’s largest company in terms of gas reserves and production, as it accounts for 20% of global production. It also 
occupies a dominant position on the Russian gas market, since it controls over 60% of domestic gas reserves (Russia has the world’s 
largest gas deposits) and up to 85% of Russian gas production (according to Gazprom’s own figures for 2007). Gazprom also holds 
a monopoly on gas exports from Russia.
• Production has been decreasing for the last few years in most of the fields currently operated by Gazprom, including the three most 
important ones which together account for around 65% of the monopoly’s production (Urengoy, Yamburg and Medvezhye) because the reserves 
of the currently operated, geologically ‘simpler’ layers are depleting, and also because of ineffective and obsolete extraction technology, etc. 
• Decreasing production in the ‘old’ fields is being offset by:  
- production in the Zapolyarnoye field which was brought online in 2001 (in 2007, Zapolyarnoye accounted for around 18% 
of Gazprom’s production), 
- supplies from independent Russian gas producers (including Novatek), and 
- gas supplies from Central Asia.
• Gazprom is also working to launch extraction from deeper layers of the West Siberian deposits and to put new fields into operation 
(including Bovanenkovskoye in the Yamal Peninsula and Shtokman in the Barents Sea). However, work on the new fields will take 
years to complete – investments are in the early stages of implementation, and will require colossal expenditure. For these re-
asons, and because of the recent adjustments in Gazprom’s current investment policy in connection with the ongoing economic crisis, 
the start of production in these fields may be delayed. For example, the start of work on the Bovanenkovskoye field was postponed by 
one year in June 2009 (according to the current plans, the first phase of production in this field may start in the second half of 2012), 
and the target production volumes will not be reached for the next couple of years.
• At the same time, due to reduced gas consumption on the internal Russian market and in Europe (as a result of the crisis, but also 
as a consequence of the progress made in achieving EU energy policy targets), demand for Russian gas will be lower in the next few 
years. Thus, production in the currently running West Siberian fields will be lower than originally expected, mitigating the risk that 
Gazprom might be unable to meet its contractual commitments to foreign customers in the coming years. 
 
3Major gas fields in Russia – reserves and production
Source: Gazprom In figures 2003–2007 (http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/56/123567/stat_eng_2007.pdf) websites of extraction companies 
(http://old.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article21652.shtml)
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• For the last five years, Gazprom’s production has remained relatively stable. According to the company’s own figures, Gazprom produ-
ced around 550 bcm of gas in 2008. Gazprom’s exports have varied more, as they increased by around 20% between 2005 and 2008. 
Last year, the company exported 280.9 bcm of gas (Gazprom’s figures for 2008). However, these figures differ from the International 
Energy Agency’s data, according to which exports have been falling gradually since 2006 (by more than 5% in 2007). 
• In 2009, in connection with the ongoing economic crisis and the decrease in demand for gas in Russia (by around 10%1) and in Europe 
(by around 7%2), Gazprom has been reducing its production; in the first three quarters of 2009 it produced 319 bcm, 22.7% less than 
in the same period last year. Production in September 2009 was lower by around 15% than in September 20083. Total production in 2009 
is expected to fall; according to estimates made this autumn, it will amount to 450–490 bcm4. The final volume of production will also de-
pend on the quantity of gas purchased from the Central Asian states; as of April 2009, Gazprom has cut gas imports from Turkmenistan by 
more than 90%. However, if the company were to meet its contractual commitments and purchase gas from Turkmenistan in the quantities 
provided for in the contracts for 2009, then domestic production could be even lower.  
• Gas exports have also been decreasing: between January and September 2009 they dropped by around 28% compared to the previous 
year5, and Gazprom expects total exports to Europe6 in 2009 to reach around 142 bcm (marking a decrease of around 22% compared 
to 20087); according to Russian analysts, this figure may be even lower.  
• The crisis has also prompted Gazprom to make adjustments to its production forecasts for the coming years. Even though no official 
forecasts are available, according to statements by Gazprom officials quoted in the Russian media this autumn, production will increase 
to around 510–520 bcm in 20108, and may not return to 2008 levels by 20129. No adjustments to Gazprom’s long-term production 
forecasts are currently available.
1 9.7% between October 2008 and September 2009, calculations based on figures of the Russian Energy Ministry,, http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/statistic/1927.html (accessed on 16 October 2009)
2 Forecast for the whole of 2009, quoted from the Eurogas chief on 1 October 2009, http://www.eurogas.org/uploaded/09P476%20-%20Press%20release%20Eurogas%20Annual%20Conference%20
and%20forecast%20results.pdf 
3 From the Russian Energy Ministry, http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/statistic/1927.html (accessed on 16 October 2009)
4 http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/2009/10/12/857973
5 From the Russian Energy Ministry, http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/statistic/1927.html (accessed on 16 October 2009)
6 To buyers of Russian gas beyond the former Soviet area (understood as the CIS, Georgia and the Baltic States)
7  In 2008, exports to Europe amounted to 184.4 bcm according to Gazprom’s figures. http://www.gazprom.ru/marketing/
8 http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/2009/10/12/857973
9  According to June 2009 reports in the Russian media, the production forecast for 2010 was 507 bcm, 510 bcm for 2011, and 523 bcm for 2012.
5Dynamics of Gazprom’s gas output and export
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• In 2008, the twenty-seven EU member states consumed more than 533 bcm of gas (IEA), of which more than 60% was imported from 
outside the European Union.
• There is a clear asymmetry between the EU-15 countries (the so-called old member states) and the EU-12 (the new member states) 
with regard to both consumption and gas imports:
- the old member states account for more than 85% of total gas consumption in the EU, 
while the new member states consume less than 15%; 
- a similar tendency holds for imports: most of the gas imported to the EU is purchased by the EU-15 countries (85%), 
while the EU-12 countries buy a quantity that is several times smaller (15%). 
• The old and new member states also differ with regard to the degree of diversification of their gas supply sources; 
- in the EU-15, the structure of gas imports is well diversified with three main sources of supplies: 
Russia (31%), Norway (30%) and Algeria (18%); 
- in the EU-12, the structure of gas imports is dominated by Russia, which provides more than 85% of the gas supplied. 
• The above differences are among the main reasons for the discrepancies in how these two groups of countries view the main challen-
ges of the EU’s energy policy and the ways proposed to enhance the security of energy supplies.
• The consequences of the differences in the degree of supplies diversification, and the deep dependence of Central European states 
on gas supplies from Russia (provided under long-term contracts with Gazprom, but also from the intermediary companies related 
to the Russian monopoly such as RUE) could be observed in the first quarter of 2009. Those countries that have well-diversified gas 
supply baskets could optimise their purchase costs by selecting the cheapest suppliers. As a result, the volume of Gazprom’s exports 
decreased substantially (by 30% to the EU as a whole, including by around 50% to Germany and Italy) because the prices offered by 
the Russian company were among the highest in Europe, due to the relatively inflexible calculation formula. Meanwhile, the Central 
European countries that depend on gas supplies from Russia not only bought their gas at prices higher than the European average 
in the first quarter of 2009, but in some cases (Poland and the Baltic states), they also increased the volumes of gas imported.
7Sources of gas imports to the EU in 2008
‘OlD’ MEMBER STATES  (EU-15) ‘NEW’ MEMBER STATES (EU-12) 
Gas imports: 274.15 bcm Gas imports: 50.26 bcm
Source: IEA, Natural Gas Information 2009 (figures for 2008); www.gazprom.ru
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• Gazprom occupies a dominant position as the supplier of natural gas, first of all in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. 
For the other European states, gas from Russia is only one item in a diversified basket of supplies (as is the case in Germany, 
France and Italy). In some cases it even contributes to enhancing the diversification of supplies, by enabling a favourable change 
in the structure of supplies and reducing the dependence on other suppliers (as is the case for Spain). 
• According to Gazprom’s figures, the largest buyers of Russian gas in 2008 were:
- Germany (38 bcm), 
 - Turkey (23.8 bcm), 
- Italy (22.4 bcm), 
- Belarus (21.1 bcm). 
• Russia also acts as an intermediary in gas exports from the post-Soviet Central Asian states to Europe.  Gas purchased by Gazprom 
is transmitted via Russian gas pipelines (owned by Gazprom), and the state controls all gas transit. Before the end of 2008, the Ros- 
-UkrEnergo company (RUE, in which Gazprom holds 50% and the holding of Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash holds 45%) played 
a key role in the trade in Central Asian gas. Gazprom bought over 66 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 
and then through RUE sold most of this quantity to European countries (especially Ukraine, but also Poland and Hungary), and to 
ZMB (currently Gazprom Germania), the German subsidiary of Gazprom. In 2009 this model was changed as a result of two develop-
ments: firstly, RUE was excluded from intermediation in gas trade, and secondly, in the first half of the year Gazprom substantially 
reduced gas purchases from Central Asia (Turkmenistan), as well as the exports of Central Asian gas to Europe, in connection with 
the drop in demand and the relatively high price of Central Asian gas.
9Gazprom as gas supplier
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• Gazprom’s presence in the EU upstream sector is negligible.
• The Russian monopoly is present in the British and Dutch North Sea shelf, where Gazprom Germania holds shares in four small gas 
exploration and production blocks (although production has not started in any of them as yet). 
11
Gazprom’s upstream investments in the EU
Source: ZBM Annual reports
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• The gas export routes from Russia to Europe are diversified to only a small degree, and the largest portion of gas is transited to end- 
-consumers via third countries. Despite Gazprom’s efforts to limit the importance of the Ukrainian gas transit corridor, it remains the main 
export route. Ukrainian pipelines transmit 66% of the c. 155 bcm of gas sent from Russia to the EU (calculated on the basis of Gazprom’s 
figures for 2008) . The other two routes of Russian gas exports to Europe, the Yamal-Europe and Blue Stream gas pipelines, play a con-
siderably less important role. 
• Gazprom co-owns and/or co-operates all the gas pipelines in the Baltic states and Moldova, the entire Yamal gas pipeline, a 37.5% share 
in other gas pipelines in Belarus, and most gas pipelines in Finland (through its 25% stake in Gasum Oy).  It also holds shares in the Yamal 
gas pipeline in Poland (48.64%), in some gas pipelines in Germany (50% less 1 share in the gas pipeline network of Wingas, and 5.26% 
in VNG’s network in eastern Germany); through Wingas it will also hold shares in the OPAL gas pipeline currently under construction. 
The takeover of 50% of the Austrian gas hub in Baumgarten is currently being finalised (to be completed by the end of 2009). 
In other European countries, Gazprom is only planning to invest in the gas transmission systems. 
• Gazprom holds shares in several European underground gas storage facilities  through the stakes it holds in Germany’s Wingas and VNG, 
as well as Latvia’s Latvijas Gaze, and is leasing some storage capacity in depots in other EU countries, including the UK. 
Gazprom’s projected investments
The Russian company plans to make a number of new investments in gas infrastructure, among which the Nord Stream and South Stream projects are 
the most important. Although the company has stepped up efforts to accelerate their implementation this year (in particular, to ensure project financing in spite 
of the ongoing crisis, and to boost the pipelines’ importance for the EU as it looks to diversify its gas supplies), it is still not certain that both of these pipelines 
will in fact be built. However, in the case of Nord Stream (work on which is far more advanced than on South Stream), several key issues concerning its imple-
mentation might be resolved by the end of 2009. For example, all the construction permits for the pipeline will probably be awarded, including the permit from 
Sweden which has been raising reservations concerning the project; also, Gaz de France is to join the Nord Stream consortium.
The objectives of Gazprom’s planned investments are:
• to diversify gas export routes to the EU through the construction of new connections bypassing the current transit countries (the Nord Stream and South 
Stream projects);
• to step up control over gas transit to and transport within the EU and keep liquidity on the EU market (through investments in interconnectors, hubs and storage);
• to impede the implementation of other gas pipeline projects intended to enable gas supplies to the EU from sources alternative to Russia;
• the very process of promoting new gas pipeline projects is also an important instrument for Russia to influence the policies of individual states and the EU 
as a whole (such as the activities regarding the South Stream project).
1   According to the IEA, Russian gas exports to the EU were lower by nearly 30 bcm , i.e. amounted to 127 bcm.
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Gazprom’s major investments in gas infrastructure in Europe: existing & planned
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• Gazprom has gained direct access to the final gas market in the Baltic states, Moldova, Finland, Germany (through shares in companies 
present on that market) and Ukraine (without taking over any assets; Gazprom’s subsidiary GazpromZbyt has been dealing with gas sales to 
end-consumers in Ukraine since 2008). In the other European countries, Gazprom has only a small direct presence on the final gas market. 
• Gazprom is also involved in the indirect sale of gas to final consumers; that is, sales via other companies with which the Russian company 
has more or less transparent relations. Such companies have benefited from the liberalisation of the EU gas market, and they sign the con-
tracts for the provision of gas to end-consumers. These have been increasingly active in the EU, although the pace of their growth is being 
restrained by European competitors, as well as by national and EU-wide legislation.
Examples of intermediary companies trading Russian gas in Central and Eastern Europe:
Vemex – This company has operated in the Czech Republic since 2006. It is owned by Gazprom Germania (51%), Austria’s Centrex Europe Energy & Gas 
(33%) and EW East-West Consult (16%), all of which probably have direct or indirect ownership connections with Gazprom. Vemex has signed a deal with 
Gazprom for the supply of 0.5 bcm of gas a year between 2008 and 2012; currently it controls around 12% of the Czech gas market. The company also holds 
a licence to sell gas in Slovakia.  
Emfesz – This company operates mainly in Hungary, where it holds a share of over 20% on the internal gas market. It is currently owned by Rosgaz, a company 
about which little is known and which is probably indirectly related to Gazprom. Emfesz is in talks with the Russian side concerning new terms and conditions 
for its gas purchases; it is temporarily receiving gas under short-term deals with E.On Foldgaz because the contract it has signed with RUE for the years 
2005-2015 cannot be implemented (as RUE has been excluded from intermediation in gas trade since January 2009). Emfesz is also interested in entering 
the Polish market. In 2006, it signed an agreement to supply gas to a Polish manufacturer of artificial fertilisers (the agreement has expired), and intends to 
build an underground gas storage facility in Poland. In addition to operating in the gas sector, the company has made efforts to enter the electricity market 
(in Hungary, Romania and others), although it did not achieve any major success in this regard in 2008. 
Conef – This company is associated with Marco Group, the owner of Romania’s Alro aluminium holding (the Marco Group is registered in Canada, and is 
supposedly owned by a Russian oligarch). Since 2002, it has operated on the Romanian market as an intermediary trading Russian gas in co-operation with 
Gazprom. In 2007, the company signed a twenty-year contract with Gazprom to supply 2 bcm of gas a year. Another such company operating on the Roma-
nian market is the Cyprus-registered Imex Oil, also associated with Alro. 
Dujotekana – This company has been operating in Lithuania since 2001 as an intermediary trading Russian gas. It is the third largest gas importer in Lithu-
ania (after the former state-run monopoly Lietuvos Dujos and the Achema company). It is also importing gas under a contract with Gazprom for the period 
2002–2012, and sells gas on a wholesale basis, mainly to Lithuania’s power plants. In addition to gas sales, Dujotekana is also involved in electricity and heat 
generation, and in electricity sales. The company was probably created by Gazprom in order to facilitate a takeover of shares in Lietuvos Dujos. It has been 
the Russian monopoly’s strategic partner in Lithuania until recently, although in recent years its situation has been deteriorating.
15
Gazprom’s share in European final gas market
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• Gazprom has made relatively few investments outside the EU gas sector. The company is mainly active in the power-generation, 
chemical and oil sectors. Despite the ongoing economic crisis, in the course of last year Gazprom’s subsidiary Gazpromneft became 
actively engaged in the European oil sector (through investments in Serbia and Italy). Gazprom also has quite ambitious plans to invest 
in the power-generation sector in Europe; it has declared that it will participate in planned power plant projects in Germany, Turkey, 
Latvia and other countries, although most of these plans are currently rather lacking in specifics.
• Gazprom has a direct presence in lithuania, where it owns a gas-fired power plant in Kaunas. It holds 51% of shares in the Serbian 
NIS holding (which owns the Pancevo and Novi Sad refineries, as well as a network of petrol stations) and a stake in the relatively small 
motor oil and lubricants plant in Bari, Italy (Gazpromneft Lubricants Italia S.p.A).
• So far, investments in the so-called big chemical industry have been made by companies indirectly related to Gazprom (Germany’s 
Akfem and the Estonian artificial fertiliser manufacturer Nitrofert, owned by the Dymytro Firtash holding).
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Gazprom’s major investments in electricity generation and chemical industry in Europe
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Gazprom’s mode of operation
The character of the Russian company’s presence in Europe is defined not only by its actual possessions, but also by the specific ways 
in which it operates: the forms of its presence in particular countries, the way it uses its assets, its information policy, its manners of con-
duct with third countries, etc. The objective of this part of the report is to present some of the typical methods Gazprom has been employing 
on the European market.
a) Overusing its dominant market position 
Gazprom is the only external exporter of gas to the EU which holds a complete or near-complete monopoly on gas supplies to a number 
of member states (especially in Central Europe and the Balkans, as well as in Finland). It sometimes uses its position as the dominant, 
and in some cases only supplier, in order to:
• become involved on the EU internal markets, for example through the practice observed in recent years whereby Gazprom requires 
additional provisions concerning, for instance, access to the internal market for companies related to the Russian monopoly, when 
signing new supply contracts or renegotiating existing ones; 
• apply different gas prices to buyers from the same area (see the example of the Baltic states, as well as the practice employed 
in the CIS, see p. 20); 
• restrict the countries concerned from diversifying their sources of gas supplies (see the example of the Baltic states, and the measures 
taken by Russia and Gazprom in the Balkans and in Turkey in order to prevent the implementation of the Nabucco gas pipeline project); 
• suppress the development of genuine competition on the gas market (see the example given below of the Baltic states and Hungary, p. 23). 
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1. Gazprom is the exclusive supplier of gas to Lithuania and Estonia, and in the case of Latvia it supplies 70% of gas and controls 
the entire supply system.
2. The former state-owned monopolies dealing with the import and distribution of gas and operating the entire gas infrastructure have 
been privatised in all three Baltic states. As a result of these privatisations, Gazprom has acquired one-third of the stakes in the Lithu-
anian, Latvian and Estonian companies, and its strategic partner, E.ON Ruhrgas, is the major shareholder in all three companies.
3. Apart from the former monopolies, a number of private companies are operating on the Baltic markets, and they import gas directly 
from Gazprom (such as large industrial companies like Estonia’s Nitrofert and Lithuania’s Achema, and intermediary companies 
such as Lithuania’s Dujotekana). There are many indications that informal links exist between those companies and Gazprom.
4. Gazprom holds the largest share on the final gas market in the Baltic states.
5. Gazprom’s strong presence affects the shape of the Baltic states’ gas sectors and their energy security;
a) no diversification – the Baltic states’ gas pipeline system is at present largely isolated and connected only with the Russian sys-
tem. No projects for diversification are realistic at this stage.
b) superficial liberalisation – while several companies import gas to Lithuania and Estonia, supplies to all three Baltic states are 
controlled by Gazprom. It is unlikely that new companies independent of Gazprom could emerge on those markets.
c) no modernisation – so far, there have been practically no investments to modernise the infrastructure Gazprom owns.
d) ‘European’ gas prices – until 2007, the Baltic states paid lower prices for gas supplied from Russia. In 2008, the prices for 
the largest importers in Lithuania (Lietuvos Dujos) and Latvia (Latvijas Gaze) were raised to ‘European’ levels. According to 
the Lithuanian media, in September 2008 the price for Lietuvos Dujos was US$520–540 per 1000 m3 – higher than the ave-
rage price paid by European buyers (around US$460 by France, around US$484 by Germany, and around US$500 by Italy).
CASE STUDY: The gas sector in the Baltic states – the strong Gazprom presence
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b) Pricing policy
• Gazprom’s pricing policy is not fully transparent. The price of gas does not always depend solely on economic considerations. Pricing 
policy is sometimes used as an instrument in pursuit of Russia’s political and/or economic interests in particular states.
• This tendency has mainly been observed in the CIS area and in Georgia, where there are still quite considerable differences betwe-
en the prices of gas and the rates at which prices for the individual states rise. In the fourth quarter of 2008, Armenia and Belarus 
paid the lowest prices (US$110 and US$128 per 1000 m3 respectively), while Moldova and Georgia bought their gas at the highest 
prices (US$287.60 and US$235 respectively). Obtaining lower gas prices usually requires some concessions to be made to Russia. 
In the case of Armenia, Gazprom took control over strategic assets in the energy sector (the ArmRosGaz company, practically all gas 
infrastructure in the country, and the fifth block of the Razdan power plant), in the aftermath of the signature of a three-year gas deal 
in April 2006. Currently the Russians are suggesting that the price (which has been raised in the meantime) could be cut in exchange for 
concessions to the Russian state-owned Atomstroiexport company, which has been seeking to build a new nuclear power plant in Armenia 
(the tender is to be resolved before the end of this year). In the case of Belarus, maintaining the relatively low gas price has been lin-
ked to Gazprom’s takeover of shares in Beltransgaz, the national gas transmission and distribution monopoly. The preferential prices 
may also be interpreted as support for the regimes in Minsk and Yerevan, with which Moscow has traditionally had close relations. 
By analogy, high gas prices are paid by those countries with which Russia has had difficult political relations (such as Georgia), 
and/or those where Moscow has already accomplished its most important objectives (as in Moldova, where Gazprom gained control 
of a majority stake in Moldovagaz, the national gas monopoly, several years ago).
• Additionally, statements about the very possibility of a price increase are sometimes used to further Russian interests, often unrela-
ted directly to the question of gas supplies. The question of raising or keeping the lower price for Ukraine used to resurface whenever 
Ukraine stepped up efforts linked to its aspirations to NATO membership (such as the efforts to obtain the MAP in the first half of 2008), 
or reopened the discussion about the terms on which the Black Sea Fleet is stationed in its territory (as happened in 2006); and Gazprom’s 
announcement concerning a drastic price increase (over fourfold) in late 2005 was being associated with the approaching elections 
in Ukraine, among other factors. 
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Prices of Russian gas
price per 1000 m3 as of September 2008
* supplies to Lietuvos Dujos, figures quoted from Lithuanian media
** publicly disclosed prices under the agreements signed with Russia/Gazprom in 2008
*** prices as per Argus estimates, quoted from Argus Gas Connections, 13 November 2008
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c) Using untransparent intermediary companies
• Gazprom is present on European gas markets not only in its own right, but also through third companies that are more or less 
formally linked to the Russian monopoly. Those companies, which often have untransparent ownership structures, act as intermedia-
ries in gas trade (especially in trading Central Asian gas purchased by Gazprom, as RUE did); they also become involved in the EU sta-
tes’ internal markets (such as Emfesz in Hungary, Vemex in the Czech Republic, Overgas in Bulgaria and Dujotekana in Lithuania). 
• Those companies are able to co-ordinate their operations with Gazprom, to the detriment of the states in which they operate. 
The co-ordinated action in late 2006 taken by the largest gas suppliers to Poland, Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo, may serve as an example; 
the signature of a deal for gas supplies from RUE in 2007–2010 was then made conditional on Warsaw’s acceptance of a higher price 
for the gas supplied by Gazprom under its long-term deal (the so-called Yamal contract).
• The seizure of significant share of the market by such untransparent companies may pose risks for the security and stability of gas 
supplies to domestic consumers. The problems with which Hungary has been struggling since January 2009 (see box) is the most 
evident example of this kind of threat.
• In addition, the use of intermediary companies which are somewhat less than fully reliable may be conducive to the formation of corruption- 
-generating relations in the gas sectors of the states concerned, as the operation of such companies benefits specific persons 
or groups, at the expense of both Gazprom and domestic consumers.
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One of the most important challenges to gas security in Hungary at the present time concerns the fact that no stable, longer-term 
conditions have been established for the supply of gas to the more than 20% of Hungarian consumers who receive their gas from 
Emfesz, a company with links to Gazprom. An additional challenge is posed by the fact that the company is currently owned by 
a less-than-reliable business with an opaque ownership structure, and with no documented experience in the gas sector or access to 
gas resources. 
Until the end of 2008, Emfesz received gas (under a ten-year contract for 2005–2015) from the intermediary RUE (which 
is 50%-owned by Gazprom), and was owned by a holding controlled by the Ukrainian entrepreneur Dymytro Firtash, who also 
co-owned RUE. As a result of Gazprom’s decision to exclude RUE from gas trade, Emfesz started to experience difficulties with gu-
aranteeing gas supplies to its customers in Hungary. In May 2009, the company’s ownership was changed in an untransparent man-
ner, without Firtash knowing about it; Gazprom probably did know and, perhaps, inspired the change itself. As a result of a US$1 
transaction, Emfesz became the property of RosGas, a company about which little is known apart from the fact that, according 
to the information available, it was created in late 2008 and is registered in Switzerland. No permanent new rules of gas supplies 
to Emfesz have yet been developed. The company is temporarily receiving its supplies from E.ON Foldgas Trade (which buys gas from 
Gazprom through the intermediary PanRusGas, a joint venture of Gazprom and E.ON). 
The takeover of shares in Emfesz illustrates the threats involved in untransparent companies with opaque ownership structures ente-
ring the liberalised EU markets. When RUE stopped supplying gas to Emfesz, which accounted for a substantial portion of domestic 
consumption, the Hungarian government had no formal instruments to demand that supplies be resumed. Neither did they have any 
influence on the change in Emfesz’s ownership, as it was acquired by RosGas, an unknown, untransparent company without any expe-
rience in the gas sector; nor on devising new import terms and conditions that would have been favourable to domestic consumers 
(since early 2009, Emfesz has been buying gas at prices higher than the European average).
CASE STUDY – EMFESZ
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d) Efforts to keep control over gas exports from Central Asia and gain influence on other exporters of gas to Europe  
• Central Asia / the Caspian region. Gazprom seeks to maintain control of the majority of gas exports from Central Asia, and to ma-
intain its ability to benefit from its position as a quasi-monopsony (for example from being able to stop collecting gas supplied under 
a contract in force, as it did in the case of Turkmenistan). Gazprom also wishes to gain control of most of Azerbaijan’s gas exports. 
At the same time, however, Russia’s position in the Caspian gas market is coming under increasingly serious challenge – China, whose 
importance in the region is growing, is a real competitor (an export gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to 
China is to be launched in late 2009, thanks to Chinese engagement); the West is to a greater extent interested in importing gas from 
the region (in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, and in connection with accelerated work on the Southern Gas Corridor, 
among other factors); and finally, the Caspian states themselves are looking to diversify their gas export routes and directions (in recent 
months Turkmenistan has been particularly active in seeking alternatives to Russian export routes). As it becomes increasingly likely 
that Russia’s role in the region could be permanently diminished, Gazprom (and Russia) are stepping up activities in the gas-producing 
countries, and both modifying and toughening their methods of operation.
• The ‘gas OPEC’. Gazprom has also been trying to influence the activities of other gas exporters, and in particular, the implementation 
of their export projects that concern the European market. Gazprom and Russia wish to co-operate with gas-exporting countries within 
the framework of bilateral relations and in multilateral formats (especially through the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, the so-called 
‘gas OPEC’ in which Russia seeks to play the leading role). Gazprom’s objective is to maintain (or even strengthen) its position as the 
most important gas exporter. In the longer term, co-operation with other gas exporters may also be a way to develop instruments to 
influence gas prices (both in response to short-term declines, as during the current crisis, but also in connection with the possibility that 
gas prices might fall more permanently as a result of the liberalisation of the EU gas market and the ongoing diversification of supply 
sources). So far, however, these bilateral contacts have not produced any significant tangible effects, and the GECF has been important 
mainly in the political and PR dimensions. 
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Gas exporters co-operating with Gazprom
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Conclusions
1. The economic crisis has not contributed to the acceleration of Gazprom’s expansion in Europe. In particular, Gazprom has not expanded 
its investment presence in the EU gas sector to any considerable degree over the last year. Its subsidiaries have acquired shares 
in two relatively small Italian companies (Gazpromneft Lubricants Italia and A2A Beta). Gazprom has also signed several contracts 
to supply gas (in relatively small quantities): it extended three long-term deals (with Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia), concluded a deal 
for gas supplies from the Nord Stream pipeline to Denmark’s DONG Energy (1 bcm), and signed two agreements providing for the joint 
sale of gas by Russian-Italian consortia on Italy’s internal market (for a total of around 2 bcm). 
2. Gazprom has noticeably stepped up its PR and lobbying activities, especially with a view to promoting its priority infrastructure 
projects (Nord Stream and South Stream), and obtaining political support and financing for these two undertakings together with 
its Western partners. So far (October 2009), these efforts have not resolved the key problems or enabled work on the two projects 
to start. However, a qualitative change is possible in the coming months, as a result of which work on the Nord Stream will progress 
if (a) Finland and Sweden approve the construction of the route, and (b) the French Gaz de France joins the consortium of companies 
implementing the project.
3. Gazprom’s activities in the EU’s neighbourhood have produced tangible results; the company has expanded the stake it holds 
in Beltransgaz, the Belarusian transmission infrastructure operator (in line with the provisions of the 2007 agreement), strengthened 
its position on the Ukrainian internal market (under the Russian-Ukrainian agreement ending the 2009 gas conflict), and taken over 
Serbia’s NIS fuel complex (after lengthy negotiations, as part of a package of Russian-Serbian agreements). The economic crisis and 
the declining prices of assets in the oil and gas sectors were not the direct reasons for Gazprom’s expansion in any of the above cases.
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4. The threats posed by the way Gazprom operates – to wit, the fact that it combines its position as the dominant and sometimes exclusive 
supplier of gas with not always fully transparent modes of functioning – became apparent in 2009:
• the two-week interruption of gas supplies to more than a dozen European countries in January 2009 has so far entailed no financial 
consequences for the company (apart from lost profits for undelivered gas) – none of the European partners have sued Gazprom for 
temporary non-performance under the contract, or for the losses incurred as a result of interrupted supplies;
• the fact that Gazprom has excluded RUE (which it co-owns) from gas trading has rendered the latter permanently unable to meet 
its contractual commitments to European gas consumers, and has disrupted the stability of gas supplies to Poland and Hungary. 
Both countries are still suffering from the negative consequences of Gazprom’s decision:
a) in Poland, RUE has failed to supply around 2.3 bcm of gas (corresponding to around 15% of domestic gas consumption) under the contract 
in force for 2009. This quantity was only partly offset by additional gas supplies (1 bcm) from Gazprom. Given the absence of alternative 
sources, Poland is now working to sign a new contract with Gazprom that would cover a period of several years, and provide for 
the supply of the missing quantity of gas (around 2–3 bcm a year) starting from 2010. However, the conclusion of this deal is being 
impeded by the fact that the Russian side has set forth additional conditions, which are not directly related to the question of the gas 
supplies to be included in the deal. Unless the contract is signed by the end of 2009, Poland may experience gas shortages as early 
as the 2009–2010 winter season. 
b) In the case of Hungary, no permanent terms have been agreed upon yet to supply gas to the more than 20% of domestic consumers 
who until now received their gas under a contract for 2005–2015 signed with RUE by the Gazprom-related Emfesz company. 
An additional challenge has been posed by the fact that Emfesz currently has a new owner, RosGas, which most probably has links to 
Gazprom, has an untransparent ownership structure, and has neither documented experience in the gas sector nor apparent access 
to gas sources. 
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Appendix 1
Major contracts concluded by Gazprom or its related companies with EU gas buyers in 2006–2009
Country Duration Annual supplies Description Additional arrangements
Austria 2012–2027 7 bcm Gazprom's contract with OMV and EconGas and with 
GWH and Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG
- OMV replaced by EconGas as the buyer of gas
- Gazprom’s related companies GWH and Centrex were granted the right to sell 
gas (around 1.75 bcm a year) to end-consumers in Austria
Germany 
(VNG)
2014–2031 5.25 bcm 
(with an option 
to increase supplies)
Contract between WIEH (joint company of Gazprom and 
Wintershall) and Verbundnetzgas (VNG). 
Through WIEH, Gazprom also sells gas on the markets of other EU countries
Germany 
(E.ON)
2011–2036 4 bcm 
(Nord Stream)
Contract for supplies via the Nord Stream gas pipeline 
concluded between Gazprom and E.ON 
Germany 
(E.ON)
2020–2035 20 bcm Extension of current contracts which expire in 2020, 
Gazprom's contract with E.ON, 
Italy 2017–2035 22 bcm Gazprom's contract with ENI concluded as part of a new 
strategic partnership agreement, extension of contracts 
currently in force
- admission of Gazprom’s related companies (GMT Italia, Centrex) 
to the Italian internal market starting from 2007, and sales of a maxi-
mum of 3 bcm of gas a year in 2010 
- Eni has obtained a pledge that it will be allowed to acquire assets 
in Russia
Italy 2008–2022 0.9 bcm 
(with an option 
to increase supplies)
Gas will be sold to a joint-venture company created for this 
purpose by the joint-venture of A2A SpA and Iride SpA 
with Gazprom Export and ZMB Gmbh
may be extended by 5 years
Italy 2009–2019 1 bcm (first 3 years); 
0.5 bcm (subsequent 7 
years)
Gazprom’s contract with Sinergie Italiane consortium 
concluded in August 2009
plans to establish a joint-venture company to sell gas in nortnern Italy 
France 2012–2030 12 bcm 
+ 2.5 bcm 
(Nord Stream)
Extension of the current contract between Gazprom and 
Gaz de France, and agreement for supplies via the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline
- admission of Gazprom’s subsidiary GMT France onto the French internal 
market, and sales of up to 1.5 bcm of gas a year starting from 2007
Czech Republic 
(RWE)
2014–2035 9 bcm Gazprom's contract with RWE Transgas; extension of cur-




2008–2012 0.5 bcm Contract for the supplies to the company controlled by 
Gazprom, which supplies gas to some industrial consumers 
in the Czech Republic; may be extended by 5 years
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Country Duration Annual supplies Description Additional arrangements
Bulgaria 2011–2030 3 bcm Extension of current contract between Gazprom 
and Bulgargaz 
The extension of the contract was subject to its renegotiation and replacement 
of the barter settlements by cash payments for gas transit.
The agreement provides for increasing gas transit via Bulgaria in return for 
co-operation on the implementation of Russian gas pipeline projects (e.g. through 
the use of Bulgaria’s underground gas depots for this purpose). 
Romania 
(WIEH)
2012–2030 4.5 bcm extension of current contract
Romania 
(Conef)
2010–2030 2 bcm Gazprom's contract with Conef Energy SRL, supplies to 
the Alro Stalina aluminium plant
Denmark 2011–2031 1 bcm contract for supplies from the Nord Stream, concluded by 
Gazprom with DONG Energy 
Denmark 2011–2030 1 bcm contract for supplies from the second branch of the Nord 
Stream, concluded by Gazprom with DONG Energy 
Turkey 2007–2021 0.25 bcm Gazprom's contract with Shell Enerji A.S. (as part 
of the liberalisation of Turkey's gas market, BOTAS is 
admitting other companies to the external market)
Turkey 2008–2021 0.75 bcm Gazprom's contract with Bosphorus Gas A.S.
Turkey 2008–2021 0.5 bcm Gazprom's contract with Avrasya A.S.
latvia 2015–2030 no data available Contract concluded between Latvijas Gaze and Gazpromem 
and Itera Latvija in February 2009
Slovakia 2009–2028 6.5 bcm Extension of the contract between SPP and Gazprom 
Export, which expired on 31 December 2008
Contract between Gazprom and Eustream for the transmission of a total 
quantity of 1 trillion m3 of gas throughout the contract’s duration
Slovenia 2010–2025 Extension of the contract with Geoplin expiring in 2010 
(unconfirmed information) 
Based on: ‘Gazprom in Europe: faster expansion in 2006’, Ewa Paszyc, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, February 2007; company websites; news agencies.
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Appendix 2
European investments by Gazprom and its related companies (excluding the CIS)
Company Country Shares Via Group Other shareholders Sector Details
‘New’ member states (EU-12)
Eesti Gaas Estonia 37.02 E.ON Ruhrgas (33.66), 
Fortum Oil&Gas (17.72), 
Itera (9.85)
import, trade, transport, 
distribution, retail
A group of three companies: 
AS Eesti Gaas, AS EG Ehitus 
and AS EG Vorguteenus
lietuvos Dujos Lithuania 37.1 E.ON Ruhrgas (38.9), 
Lithuanian government (17.7)




Lithuania 99.5 Clement Power (0.001)
Dujotekana (0.5)
electricity generation





Owner of the Inculkalns gas 
depot
EuRoPol Gaz Poland 48 PGNiG (48)
Gas Trading (4) 
transport, 
gas pipeline operator
Talks are underway concer-
ning the elimination of Gas 
Trading from the sharehol-
ding of Europol Gaz.
Gas-Trading Poland 16 Gazprom Export PGNiG (43.4), Bartimpex 
(36.1), Węglokoks (2.3), 
Wintershall (2.3)
trade and transport
Slovrusgas Slovakia 50 SPP trade and transport In liquidation since 2005 
Tagdem Slovenia 7.6 trade
Vemex Czech 
Republic
84 Gazprom Germania 
(formerly ZMB 




Gazprom Germania (była 
ZMB) (51), Centrex (33), 
EW East West Consult (16)
trade, retail shares increased from 66% 
(33% for each shareholder)
General Banking 
and Trust Co. ltd.
Hungary 25.5* Firthlion Limited banking Informal connections with 
Gazprom; shares owned 
by Gazprombank were sold 
in 2005 to Firthlion Limited  
(owned by the family 
of Megdet Rahimkulov)
PanRusGas Hungary 50 + 10% via Centrex 
Hungaria











Hungary 100* Gazprom-Media/ 
Gazprombank
media, finance
Emfesz Hungary 100* RosGas AG gas distribution Informal connections with 
Gazprom probably exist
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Company Country Shares Via Group Other shareholders Sector Details
Topenergo Bulgaria 100 trade, distribution, retail Gas trade intermediary
Overgas Inc. AD Bulgaria 50  Overgas Holding AD (50) trade and distribution
DEXIA Bulgaria 
EOOD
Bulgaria 25.5 Wintershall Erdgas 
Handelshaus Zug AG 
(51)
Gazprom Germania Agropolychim (49) gas trade
WIEE Romania Romania 50 Wintershall Erdgas 
Handelhaus Zug AG 
(100)
Gazprom Germania gas trade
WIROM Romania 25.5 Wintershall Erdgas 
Handelhaus Zug AG 
(WIEE) (51)
Gazprom Germania Distrigaz Sud (49) gas trade and distribution
leadville 
Investments ltd.























Cyprus 20* Oilsoc Gazprombank Oilinvest (46), 
Soco NA (34)




Cyprus 100* Gazprombank investments
MF Media Finance 
(Overseas) limited











Cyprus 100 Gazprom-Neft investments
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Company Country Shares Via Group Other shareholders Sector Details
‘Old’ member states (UE-15)
GWH Austria 100 50 – Gazexport, 
50 – Centrex Europe 
Energy & Gas




Energy & Gas AG
Austria 100 created in 2003 
by Gazprombank
Centrex transport, distribution, 
retail, services etc. 
Created in 2003 by Gazprom-
bank; according to some sour-
ces, 100% of shares are held 
by the Gas I fund managed 
by an investment company 
controlled by VTB; operates 
on the European market
Central ME Energy 
& Gas AG
Austria 100 Centrex Europe 
Energy & Gas
Centrex transport, distribution, 
retail, services etc.
Operates on the Central 
European market
CEA Centrex 
Energy & Gas AG
Austria 100 Central ME Energy 
& Gas (49.9), 
Gazprom Germania 
(formerly ZMB) (50.1)




Italian Gas Holding 
AG (CEIGH)
Austria 66.67 Gazprom Germania 
(formerly ZMB) 
(25.10), Centrex 
Europe Energy and 
Gas (41.57)






Arosgas Holding AG Austria 100* Gazprombank
Gazprom Neft 
Trading GmbH
Austria 100 Gazprom Neft trade in petroleum products In 2007, Sibneft Oil Trade 
Company GmbH (Siboil) was 
renamed as Gazprom Neft 
Trading GmbH.
Haidach UGS Austria 33 Gazprom Export Wingas, RAG gas depot Second part under construc-
tion, to be completed in April 




Austria 50* Gazprom Germania 
(30), Centrex Europe 
Energy and Gas (20)
Centrex, Gazprom Germania OMV (30), Vienna Stock 
Exchange (20)
gas hub Transaction not finalised, 
EC approval of the new 
shareholding structure 














Company Country Shares Via Group Other shareholders Sector Details
ZMB Gasspeicher 
Holding GmbH
Austria 100 Gazprom Germania 
(formerly ZMB) 





gas storage Created to purchase, control 
and administer blocks of sha-
res in gas storage companies
Wingas Belgium Belgium 100 Wingas Gazprom Germania trade, retail
Gasum Oy Finland 25 Fortum (31), the Finnish state 
(24), E.ON Ruhrgas (20)
gas transport 
and distribution
North Transgas Oy Finland 100 construction of gas pipelines Works on the Baltic Sea 
bottom
FRAgaz France 100 Gazprom Germania 
[formerly ZMB] (50)
gas trade Formerly a joint-venture 
company of Gazprom and 
Gaz de France; GDF sold its 
shares to ZMB in June 2008 
Gazprom Marketing 
and Trading
France 100 Gazprom Marketing 
and Trading Ltd
Gazprom Germania gas trade
Prometheus Gas Greece 50 Gazprom Export Dimitrios C. Copelouzos, 
CEO of the Copelouzos 
Group (50)
marketing and technical 
services for gas companies
Prometheus joint venture: 
Marina Zaes (>50), Euro-
prom Telecommunications 
(45), Enelco (25), Naco (25)
Peter-Gaz Netherlands 51 Heerema Oil and Gas 
Development (49)








Netherlands 100 investments, finance, 
consulting services 
Gazprom libya B.V. Netherlands 100 research a company created to mana-




Netherlands 100 foreign relations, assistance 
in mergers, acquisition of 
shares in other companies, 
business supervision
holds 50%+1 share 
in Sakhalin Energy, the 
operator of the Sakhalin-II 




Netherlands 50 ENI construction, transport a company created to build 
the Blue Stream pipeline; 
it holds shares in the land 
section of the pipeline and 
the Beregovaya compressor 
station
West East Pipeline 
Project investment
Netherlands 100 construction, investments
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Company Country Shares Via Group Other shareholders Sector Details
GazInvest 
Finance B.V.
Netherlands 100* Gazprombank Gazprombank finance
Brochan B.V. Netherlands 100* Gazprombank Gazprombank investments
NTV HTB Holding 
and Finance B.V.
Netherlands 100* Gazprom-Media/ 
Gazprombank
media
NTV Plus B.V. Netherlands 100* Gazprom-Media Gazprom-Media/ 
Gazprombank
media
Sib Finance B.V. Netherlands 100* Sibneft Oil Trade 
Company Limited
Gazpromneft finance, investments
Carbon Trade & Fi-
nance SICAR S.A.
Luxembourg 50* Gazprombank Gazprombank Dresdner Bank investments investments in projects 
concerning CO2 certificates, 
mainly in the CIS countries
DITGAS Handel-
shaus GmbH
Germany 49 Debis International Trading 
(100% subsidiary of Daimler 
Chrysler)
gas trade
Gerosgas Germany 51 E.ON gas trade, 
stock exchange operations; 
partner Ruhrgas
Under an agreement from 
June 2009, Gazprom will 
acquire the remaining 49% 
of shares in Gerosgas later 
this year. (E.ON will acquire 




Germany 5,26 Gazprom Germania EWE AG (47.9), Winter-
shall (15.79), EEG (5.26), 
VNG Verwaltungs- und 
Beteiligungsgesellschaft 




2008 information about po-
ssible co-operation between 
EWE and Gazprom that 
would enable them to control 
VNG; shares owned by EWE 
AG are being taken over 
by EnBW Energie 
Baden-Württemberg AG
ZMB Mobil Germany 100 Gazprom Germania 
(formerly ZMB)
Gazprom Germania gas applications 
in automotive industry
Wingas Germany 50%-1 Gazprom Germania Wintershall Holding AG gas distribution, transport, 
storage, trade
Wingas Transport Germany 100* via Wingas Gazprom Germania 
Wingas Transport 
Beteiligungs GmbH
Germany 16.7 Wingas Gasunie, Wintershall (50.02)
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Company Country Shares Via Group Other shareholders Sector Details
EuroHub GmbH Germany 16.7* via Wingas Gazprom Germania E.ON, BEB, Statoil gas hub Located in Haan (Germany), 
operations suspended since 




Germany 50 Gazprom Germania Group Wintershall Erdgas Beteili-
gungs-GmbH (50) – subsi-
diary of Wintershall (dau-
ghgter company of BASF)
distribution of gas supplied 
by Gazexport to 2012






Germany 18.9 Gazprom Export Volga Resources 54.1 
+ minority shareholders
insurance Supports Western investors 
in risk assessments in Russia, 
Kazakhstan and other CIS 
countries; the sale of 54.1% 
of shares in Ingosstrakh 
VAG to Volga Resources is 
currently being authorised; 
Gazprom has attempted to 
sell its shares several times






Gazprom Oil and 
Gas Germany GmbH
Germany 100 investments
Interconnector ltd. Germany 10 Gazprom Marketing 
and Trading Ltd
BG (25), E.ON (23.6), 
Distrigas (16.4), ConocoPhil-
lips (10), Total (10), ENI (5)
operator of the gas 





Germany 100* via Gazprom Marke-
ting and Trading Ltd






100 Gazprom Germania 
(formerly ZMB)





75 Wingas i ZMB 
Gasspeicher Holding
Gazprom Germania gas storage current main task: exploita-





50 subsidiary of 
WINGAS Storage UK
Gazprom Germania gas storage
WINGAS UK United 
Kingdom
50 WINGAS Gazprom Germania retail Has taken over NorskHydro’s 
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30 Gazprom Marketing 
and Trading
Gazprom Germania smart metering
Sibir Energy United 
Kingdom
55 Gazprom Neft Gazprom Neft 2.3 Bennfield (joint venture 
of Gradisson Consultants 
owned by Shalva Chigirinsky 
and Orton Oil owned by Igor 
Kasayev), 23.4 disputed 
between Shalva Chigirinsky 
and Ruslan Bajsarov, 
19.3 Moscow authorities
retail 23.35% acquired through 
the purchase of Orton Oil 
Comp. in June 2009 (Orton 
Oil Comp. holds 50% of 
shares in Bennfield, which 
holds 47% of shares in Sibir 
Energy); operator 
of the Salym field in West 
Siberia; it holds 50% of sha-
res in the Moscow refinery; 
further acquisition plans
Saltfleetby UGS United 
Kingdom
via Wingas and ZMB 
Gasspeicher Holding 
GmbH (33,3% via 
ZMB Gasspeicher 
Holding)
gas storage conversion of a natural gas 
deposit into a natural gas 
storage facility; delays 
in the authorisation process 
for construction permits; 
capacity of more 
than 700 million m3
Hydro Wingas ltd. United 
Kingdom
100* via Wingas Gazprom Germania gas trade British market; until June 
2007 a 50:50 joint-venture 
company of Wingas 
and Norwegian Norsk Hydro


































Company Country Shares Via Group Other shareholders Sector Details



























100 Gazprom Neft investments
Promgaz Italy 50 ENI gas trade and marketing
Volta Italy 49 Edison gas trade and transport
Central Energy 
Italia S.p.A.
Italy 25.1 Central Energy Italian 
Gas Holding AG
Centrex 
CEA Centrex Italia 
Srl





Italy 100 Gazprom Neft Gazprom Neft production of engine oils 
and lubricants
Transaction concluded 
in April 2009; the company 
has been renamed 
(from Chevron Italia S.p.A.); 
the plant’s annual output 
is up to 30,000 tons of oil 
and 6,000 tons of lubricants
Enia Energia S.p.A. Italy 50 Centrex Europe 
Energy & Gas AG, 
Gazprom Germa-
nia (formerly ZMB 
GmbH)
Enia S.p.A. gas and electricity provision EC approval




Gazprom Germania A2A Alfa S.r.l. (70% of A2A 
Alfa belongs to A2A S.p.A.,  
30% - to Iride S.p.A.)
gas trade
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Company Country Shares Via Group Other shareholders Sector Details
Non-EU European states and the CIS






Switzerland 50 via Wintershall 
Erdgas Handelshaus 
GmbH
Gazprom Germania Wintershall Erdgas 
Beteiligungs (50)
Baltic lNG AG Switzerland 80 via Gazprom Germa-
nia (formerly ZMB)
Gazprom Germania Sovkomflot 20
RosUkrEnergo AG Switzerland 50 Firtash Group of Companies (50) gas trade
Centrex Energy & 
Gas AG
Switzerland 100 Centrex Europe 
Energy & Gas
Centrex trade Activities focus on Central 




Switzerland 50 Centrex Europe 
Energy & Gas
Centrex Gasnex AG trade Centrex Group, deals mainly 





Switzerland 100 Gazprom Germania 
(formerly ZMB), Cen-
trex Energy & Gas AG
Gazprom Germania 
& Centrex
Centrex Energy & Gas AG exploration and development Operates in Uzbekistan
Centrex Finance AG Switzerland 100 Centrex Europe 
Energy & Gas
Centrex financial services
YugoRosGas Serbia 73 25% – Srbijagas,
minority shareholder 
– Central ME Energy 
and Gas A.G.
gas trade, transport, con-
struction of gas pipelines
Supplies gas to southern and 
central Serbia, Kosovo and 
Montenegro; operator of the 
Pojate–Nis gas pipeline; Srbija- 
gas is trying to purchase ano-
ther 24% from Gazprom
Progres Gas Trading Serbia 50 Progres DSO, NIS gas supplies, marketing
NIS Serbia 51 GazpromNeft Gazprom Neft oil refineries, trade in petro-
leum products, gas stations, 
oil depots, LNG
Operates in Serbia and 
Angola, owns refineries 
in Pancevo and Novi Sad; 
agreement in December 




Turkey 40 Gazprom Germania 
(formerly ZMB)
Gazprom Germania Tur Enerji 60 gas distribution Plans to increase the stake 
to 51% in the second half 
of 2009, and to 71% 
in the further future
Turusgas Turkey 45 Botas 35,
Gama 20
gas trade Sale of gas from the Blue 
Stream gas pipeline
GAMA Gazprom Turkey 45 Botas 35,
Gama 15.6
handel gas trade
* the share held by the company through which Gazprom holds shares (in the Via column) 
39
Gazprom holds 41% of shares in Gazprombank
Gazprom-Media is 100% controlled by the Gazprombank Group
Gazprom Germania is a 100% subsidiary of Gazprom Export
Gazprom Marketing and Trading is a 100% subsidiary of Gazprom Germania
Collected and processed by OSW, based on information from annual reports from Gazprom and Gazprombank, company websites and news agencies.
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